【学术助力】∣英语修辞复合词释义的结构基础
数量上，复合词是对有限词汇集依据句法原则的无限不重复扩充。复合词的意义可以是两个或两个以上单词意义的组合，比如汉语中的“好人”。但是，某些复合词的意义不是其单词意义的组合，而是其意义的衍生，这类复合词就被称作“修辞复合词”。比如汉语中的“红人”，“红”已不是颜色概念。英语中也有这样的词，比如red-hand，字面意思是“红手”，但这样释义是错误的，在英语中它通常指“人赃俱获”。这里的红色是鲜血，也就是杀了人，在被发现时满手是血。再比如，blue-blood，字面意思是“蓝血”,但其实指“养尊处优的贵族”。古时英国上层阶级从不劳作，通常皮肤细嫩，可以依稀见到皮肤下的青筋，被认为流着蓝色的血液。有趣的是在英汉之间“血”与“血脉”的修辞释义如出一辙，那么在修辞释义方面英汉之间还有什么共同之处呢？
无论是汉语或英语，修辞释义都涉及了两个概念之间的转换，也就是说修辞意义是字面意义的衍生。字面意义所属的某种概念与修辞意义所属的另一种概念必然存在某种经验联系，这种联系在认知上称作“概念映射”。比如“红人”中的“红”不是颜色，而指热度，也就是色度所映射的程度。blue-blood中的blood不是器官，而指宗脉，也就是生理概念所映射的社会概念。有趣的是red-hand和blue-blood概念映射的方式不同，其位置也不同，那么是否不同的位置会有不同的概念映射呢？这是否导致了英汉复合词修辞释义的不同呢？
单词在复合词中具有不同的位置，不同位置之间的差异就形成了结构。复合词的结构在语法上的规则与词在句子中的规则类似，也就是说复合词结构的依据是句法结构。因为相同的词在不同句子结构中的意义是不同的，所以语义的变化具有一定“结构基础”。那么相同的单词在不同复合词结构中的语义变化，其规律是否在修辞复合词中依然有效呢？复合词结构是否决定了其内部单词的概念映射，也就是说：普遍的概念映射是否具有相对的结构基础？如果不同的概念映射对应不同的结构基础，那么修辞复合词的释义是否可以量化并且机器识别？又是什么导致了概念映射的结构基础？
本书基于语料库的量化分析试图讨论以上这些问题。望专业读者，语言学爱好者，匡正谬误，前赴后继，百家争鸣。
The model Lakoff and Johnson (1980,2003) use to explain metaphor is called cross-domain mapping. In this model, metaphor involves two domains, namely a source domain and a target domain. The source domain is where a semantic property is taken from the concept of an entity, and the target domain is where the semantic property is attached to the concept of another entity. According to the conceptual metaphor theory, the use of metaphor is entirely based on our perception of different semantic properties which have similar attributes for association in cognition, so the cognitive mechanism of metaphor revolves around the experiential basis, a process of connecting different real-world properties by their perceived similarity. Since cross-domain mapping is entirely conceptual and only governed by real-world knowledge from experience, the experiential basis of a linguistic form isclaimed to be the only factor constraining its interpretation in language.
Figure1 Cross domain mapping in the conceptual metaphor theory
Although Lakoff and Johnson (1980,2003) do not consider compounding, the conceptual metaphor theory thus predicts that the conceptual mapping of lexemes in compounds should be determined only by their conceptual meaning. However, the problem to be addressed in this book is that the conceptual metaphor theory fails to explain different semantic interpretations of the same lexeme on the same putative experiential basis in different compound structures as in (1) and (2) below.
(1) headquarter, head-office, head-tenant, headship, headman
(2) hogshead, showerhead, warhead, power-head, machine-head
When the lexeme head is the left-hand compound member, as in (1), it is interpreted in terms of the physiological function of the body-part, or functional property henceforth; when the same lexeme is the right-hand compound member, as in (2), it is interpreted in terms of the shape of the body-part, or geometric property henceforth. Therefore, it will be interesting to investigate whether these relations between the conceptual mappings of the same lexeme and its morphological positions in compounds are applicable to other lexemes as compound members. If there are predictable relations between compound structure and conceptual mapping, they will be problematic for the conceptual metaphor theory. Therefore, this book will focus on the conceptual mapping of compound members and their compound structure, seeking to discover whether there are any significant correlations between morphological positions and semantic properties.
A strong claim of the conceptual metaphor theory is that “[t]he locus of metaphor is a matter of thought, not language” and “[t]he language is secondary, and the mapping is primary, in that it sanctions the use of source domain language and inference patterns for target domain concepts”. Therefore, the conceptual metaphor theory predicts that compound structure e.g. head versus non-head (single head) structure in English does not affect conceptual mapping, but as we shall see in this book, compound structures of lexemes make a crucial contribution to their metaphorical and metonymic interpretations.
(3) tail-rhyme, tail-end, tail-effect, tail-spin, tailrace, tail-heavy
(4) firetail, scissor- tail, silktail, swordtail, veiltail, whiptail
(5) hotfoot, dirty-finger, soft-nose,badmouth, longhand, frosty-face
For example, when the body part lexeme tail is the left-hand compound member, as in (3), the lexeme is interpreted in terms of the physical position of the body part, or positional property henceforth. In (4), when the same lexeme is the right-hand compound member, it is interpreted as referring to its super ordinate, or metonymic property henceforth. In (5), when the attributive adjectives become predicative e.g. *foot is hot, the same lexemes will not have the same metaphorical interpretation as compound members e.g. hotfoot.
These observations suggest that there may be a connection between the compound structure of lexemes and their conceptual mapping, even though such a connection seems to be rejected by the conceptual metaphor theory, in which it is claimed that “[a] linguistic expression is the surface realisation of such a cross domain mapping”. Many cases are better explained if it is assumed that cross-domain mappings in terms of experiential basis only decide the possible metaphorical candidates in thought while the formal structure of a language determines whether they are legitimate expressions for different conceptual mappings in the language. However, this is also rejected by the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor that the experiential basis of conceptual mapping in language is supposed to be universal.
“[C]an the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor simultaneously explain both universality and diversity in metaphorical thought? ... the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor can successfully perform this job”. However, apreliminary indication that this supposed “universality in metaphorical thought” is questionable as far as compounds are concerned can be seen when one compares English with Chinese. The examples in Table 1 below illustrate, first, that Chinese has compounds whose metaphorical senses are unavailable in English, and crucially that the linear order of Chinese compound members in appositional (double-head) structure also decides their conceptual mappings.
Table1 Chinese figurative compounds and their paradigmatic gaps
Column 1 | Column 2 | |||
Chinese PinYin | English equivalent | Meaning | Paradigmatic gaps | English equivalent |
/ěr/ /mù/ | Ear-Eye | Spy | */mù/ /ěr/ | Eye-Ear |
/gǎn//dǎn/ | Liver-Pancreas | Loyalty | */dǎn//gǎn/ | Pancreas-Liver |
/shǒu//zú/ | Hand-Foot | Fraternity | */zú//shǒu/ | Foot-Hand |
/jǐn//gǔ/ | Sinew-Bone | Physique | */gǔ//jǐn/ | Bone-Sinew |
/xuě//lèi/ | Blood-Tears | Suffering | */lèi//xuě/ | Tears-Blood |
In the ten Chinese appositional compounds, the same items appear, each with the same putative experiential basis, in column 1 and column 2. So for cross-domain mapping, they have the same value except for their morphological positions. But the conceptual mappingis only valid in the column 1 cases. All compounds in column 2 violate rules of Chinese tonal syntax, so they can only have their literal interpretation optionally with a particle /hé/ in between at most.
The Chinese examples above are problematic for the universal claim of the conceptual metaphor theory made by Kovecses who proposed that “[t]he causes for variation of metaphor in cultures are differential experiences and cognitive preferences or styles”. The evidence of the universal claim relies heavily on some Chinese metaphors such as “Happiness as Up”, “Anger as Gas” and their Hungarian counterparts. However, using isolated metaphorical examples in the two languages is not sufficient for a universal claim of metaphorical interpretation on an experiential basis. “[T]hese cases (examples of conceptual metaphors) serve the purpose of demonstration and they have not been systematically and exhaustively collected from large stretches of discourse but they have been selected for their persuasive power”. Therefore, this book will rely on corpus data to see whether there are any connections between conceptual mapping and compound structure.
There are usually two morphological positions in most English compounds：left and right, so the morphological positions of lexemes constitute their compound structures. As compounds are composed of independent lexemes which can have either conceptual mapping or not, the same lexeme can be either a left-hand compound member or a right-hand one in a compound and its semantic status canbe literal, metaphorical or metonymic. Though both compound members can beliteral at the same time, there are many types of combinations for at least one compound member to be figurative in a compound. First, a compound member can beliteral in one morphological position, either left or right, while the other compound member can be either metaphorical or metonymic in the other morphological position (four types). Second, a compound member can be metaphorical in one morphological position, either left or right, while the other compound member can be either metaphorical or metonymic in the other morphological position (three types). Third, both compound members can be metonymic at the same time in a compound. In this book, they are referred to as figurative compounds.
Table 2 Relations between morphological positions and semantic statuses
As exemplified above, figurative body-part lexemes, termed target lexemes henceforth, can have different semantic properties in compounds, while compound members other than the target lexemes in figurative compounds, termed companion members henceforth, can have different lexical categories. As different semantic properties and different lexical categories may have different morphological positions in compounds, there will be different relations between semantic properties and morphological positions, termed morpho-semantic relations henceforth.
Any statistically significant morpho-semantic relations will be problematic for the conceptual metaphor theory, because the experientialist explanation predicts that linguistic structure is irrelevant to conceptual mapping and there should not be any significant correlation between conceptual mapping and compound structure.
However, the experiential basis of conceptual mapping alone would not disallow both compound members of body part lexemes from being metonymic in English single head compound structure as inTable 2 given that this is allowed in Chinese double-head compound structure asin Table 1. It fails to explain the semantic difference when the same lexeme appears in different morphological positions, either as the left-hand compound members e.g. headquarter as in (1), or the right-hand one e.g. warhead as in (2). The experiential basis of figurative language would not enforce different conceptual mappings of the same lexeme between metaphorical when it is a left-hand compound member e.g. tail-rhyme as in (3), and metonymic when it is a right-hand compound member e.g. scissor-tail as in (4). Moreover, for the same lexemes, an experiential basis does not account for the difference of semantic interpretation between being figurative in an attributive compound structure e.g. hotfoot as in (5) and being literal in a predicative phrasal structure e.g. *foot is hot. All these phenomena need a better explanation than is currently provided by the cognitive theory of figurative language.
As different semantic properties may have different morphological positions in compounds, the semantic propertyof a lexeme in a morphological position may be different from that of the same lexeme in the other morphological position e.g. head-quarter versus warhead. Moreover, compounds with the exactly same lexemes will not have the same semantic interpretation when their morphological positions are different e.g. hotfoot versus *foothot. So the conceptual mapping of lexemes in one morphological position seems to be different from when they are in the other morphological position. Therefore, the hypothesis to be pursued in this book is that a semantic interpretation of a lexeme valid from the perspective of an experiential basis alone may be invalid in terms of its morphological structure, such non-equivalence relationships being termed morpho-semantic asymmetries henceforth. For example, headquarter is not interpreted as a quarter of a head, and war-head is not interpreted as a human head in a war.
A relation between compound members is asymmetric in a compound [WxWy], if the semantic interpretation of a relation between Wx and Wy is valid but the same one of another relation between Wy and Wx is not, when Wx and Wy are both morpho-phonologically distinct and in the same formal class. This predicts that there are corresponding relations between semantic interpretations of lexemes and their morphological structures.
There are two possible morpho-semantic asymmetries when compound members have similar lexical and conceptual categories, either different semantic properties of the same lexeme have different morphological positions e.g. headquarter versus warhead, or the same semantic property of different lexemes has the same morphological position e.g. head-man and brain-child versus pigtail and screw-eye. If there are systematic morpho-semantic asymmetries in the conceptual mapping of compound members, there will be significant relations between morphological positions and semantic properties of figurative compound members. From a probabilistic perspective on semantic distribution in morphological structures, these relations would provide evidence to question the experiential basis of conceptual mapping.
Obviously, compound members can have different lexical categories i.e. noun, verb and adjective, and different conceptual categories i.e. abstract versus concrete. If the observational condition of morpho-semantic asymmetries is satisfied for different compounds, the lexical and conceptual categories of their compound members will be identical in the opposite morphological positions i.e. Compound ［WX］［WY］versus Compound ［Wy］［Wx］. Under the theoretical definition of morpho-semantic asymmetries, morphological positions of lexemes are predicted to determine their semantic interpretations.Therefore, by hypothesis, conceptual mapping has a structural basis, which willbe indicated by the relations between morphological positions and the semantic properties of figurative body-part lexemes.
Compound members juxta posed in appositional structure e.g. bittersweet have the same lexical and conceptual categories, but appositional compound structure, exemplified above, may occurless frequently in English compounds than in Chinese ones. So, not being precisely in the same lexical-conceptual categories, English lexemes in a given morphological position may not satisfy the observational condition of morph-semantic asymmetries. Except for compounds with the identical lexemes in opposite morphological positions e.g. hot-foot versus *foothot, compound members may not have the same lexical-conceptual categories in opposite morphological positions i.e. left-hand versus right-hand. Since the condition of morpho-semantic asymmetries may not be completely satisfied for compounds randomly sampled, the same lexeme in the same morphological position may have different semantic interpretations when the lexical-conceptual categories of lexemes in the other morphological position are in fact different e.g. head-quarter versus headhunt. The companion members quarter and hunt have different lexical categories i.e. noun versus verb, in the left-hand position, while the target lexeme head has different interpretations i.e. metaphor versus metonymy, in the right-hand position.
Given that different semantic properties may apply to the same morphological position with different lexical-conceptual categories, the same semantic property may also have different morphological positions with different lexical-conceptual categories e.g. honey-tongue and bone-idle. Therefore, it is predicted that there will be exceptions to morpho-semantic relations when the morphological position of lexemes is analysed as the only variable in their conceptual mappings. This is mainly caused by a conflict between the random sampling of compound structures from a corpus for objectivity and the sampling scale of lexemes in different morphological positions but similar lexical-conceptual categories. To deal with the observational constraint, the process of approximation by probability is chosen in the estimation of morpho-semantic relations.
If asymmetric relations between left and right morphological positions are valid in conceptual mapping, the probability of a semantic property in a morphological position will be significantly higher than that in the other morphological position among different compounds. So, presumably, the number of exceptions to the correlations between morphological positions and semantic properties will belower than a theoretical limit known as the tolerance principle. The statistically significant correlations indicating a predictable relationship between semantic properties and morphological positions regardless of the experiential bases of lexemes will suggest that conceptual mapping has a structural basis.
The question posed in this book is whether there are any predictable relations between the conceptual mapping of compound members and compound structure. There will be three objectives achieved by answering this question.
Figure2 The structural basis of conceptual mapping
First, this study will clarify the relationship between compound structure and conceptual mapping. Second, it will specify relations between the semantic properties of figurative compound members and their morphological positions e.g. headquarter versus warhead. Any exceptions to the relations will also be examined and discussed in terms of other factors possibly involved in the relations, such as the lexical category of the companion members e.g. headcount versus shorthand, the semantic status of the companion members：figurative versus literal e.g. headhunt versus arrowhead, and the conceptual category of the compounds: abstract versus concrete e.g. head-wall versus head-strong. Third, it will serve to explain metaphorical and metonymic meanings in terms of their linguistic structures regardless of experiential bases.
The next two chapters discuss theories of figurative meaning and compounding. Chapter 4 elaborates research design and methodology. Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 describe figurative compounds sampled from the BNC in terms of the four semantic properties. Chapter 9 analyses statistical patterns in relations between compound structure and conceptual mapping. Chapter 10 examines the exceptions to the patterns in the relations. Chapter 11 introduces new theoretical proposals to explain the relationship between conceptual mapping and formal structure.